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their	 energy	 for	 much	 longer	
and	can	 inflict	 injury	quite	 far	
away	from	the	explosion.	Due	
to	 this	 extended	 range,	 most	
types	 of	 fragmenting	 AP	
mines	have	the	option	of	trip-
wire	detonation,	which	enables	
the	mine	to	go	off	when	a	per-
son	or	vehicle	trips	a	wire	up	to	
10	metres	(33	feet)	away.	
A	person	is	at	risk	in	two	dif-
ferent	 ways	 while	 travelling	 in	
an	SUV.	 If	 the	vehicle	detonates	
an	AP	 device	 that	works	 primar-
ily	through	blast,	the	distance	from	
the	 expected	 impact	 point	 (below	
a	 wheel)	 to	 the	 person	 in	 the	 vehicle	
is	normally	high	enough	to	create	a	 safe	
distance.	 However,	 if	 the	 device	 creates	
fragments,	 the	 thin	 steel	 of	 the	 car	 body	
will	 offer	 almost	no	protection	 against	 the	
high-velocity	steel	fragments.	The	standard	
car-body	steel	is	0.8	millimetre	(0.03	inch)	
thick	 and	will	 not	prevent	 fragments	 from	
entering	into	the	cabin.
To	express	 it	 another	way,	when	we	are	
talking	about	various	AP	devices,	the	main	
concern	 for	passengers	 in	 a	 vehicle	 is	 frag-
mentation	rather	than	the	shock	or	blast	ef-
fect	from	the	explosive.	
For	that	reason,	in	an	area	with	a	high	
risk	of	setting	off	fragmenting	AP	ammu-
nition,	 fully	 armoured	 SUVs	 are	 recom-
mended.	However,	apart	 from	being	very	
costly,	 excessively	 heavy	 and	 hard	 to	 ob-
tain	in	sufficient	numbers,	fully	armoured	
SUVs	 tend	 to	 give	 the	wrong	 impression	
of	 the	 humanitarian	 workers—namely	
that	they	are	not	willing	to	take	the	same	
risks	 that	 the	 inhabitants	must	 take	on	a	
daily	basis.
As	an	alternative	to	fully	armoured	vehi-
cles,	there	are	a	number	of	retrofit	solutions	
on	the	market	today	that	can	provide	a	good	
level	of	protection	 for	passengers	 travelling	
in	 soft-skinned	 vehicles.	Although	 retrofit-
ted	vehicles	do	not	provide	the	same	level	of	
protection	as	factory-armoured	SUVs,	some	
can	work	well	against	a	large	number	of	ERW	
threats	for	about	one-twentieth	the	price	of	
a	 fully	 armoured	 vehicle.	 Consequently,	 a	
much	higher	number	of	vehicles—and	thus	
passengers—can	be	protected	 for	 the	 same	
money.	In	addition,	the	retrofit	solutions	to	
protect	 soft	 vehicles,	 like	 ballistic	 blankets	
(described	below),	can	be	delivered	quickly	
and	most	can	be	installed	in	the	field.
Built-in Ballistic Blankets
Most	 retrofit	 solutions	 to	 protect	
SUVs	are	based	on	aramide	 fabric,	 such	as	
Twaron®	or	Kevlar®,	which	is	the	ballistic	
material	used	in	most	body	armour.	By	us-
ing	flexible	 armour,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 design	
solutions	that	fit	into	the	curved	interior	and	
floor	of	the	SUV.
In	 terms	 of	 level	 of	 protection,	 flex-
ible	solutions	using	aramide	on	the	interior	
and	floor	 of	 the	 vehicle	 generally	 represent	
a	lower	level	of	protection	than	those	found	
on	 the	 sides	 of	 a	 factory-armoured	 SUV.	
Ballistic	blankets	 are	 available	 from	several	
sources	 and	 are	 a	 system	 of	 tailor-cut	 and	
overlapping	blankets	 that	cover	as	much	of	
the	 interior	of	 the	vehicle	 as	possible	up	 to	
the	windows.3	
Ballistic	 blankets	 offer	 a	 good	 level	 of	
protection	against	 fragments	coming	from	
below	or	from	the	lower	sides.	They	are	in-
stalled	below	the	carpet	and	inside	the	side	
panels	 and	 doors	 and	 require	 a	 complete	
stripping	 of	 the	 vehicle.	 After	 reinstalla-
tion,	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 vehicle	 looks	 the	
same	 as	 before,	 with	 no	 visible	 signs	 of	 it	
being	protected.
The	 protection	 level	 of	 the	 blankets	 is	
normally	 specified	 according	 to	 a	 North	
Atlantic	 Treaty	 Organization	 standard	
STANAG	 [Standardisation	 Agreement]	
29202	and	 the	 standard	 level	by	most	non-
governmental	organizations	is	a	level	referred	
to	as	600	m/sec.	It	is	not	possible	to	connect	
this	 level	 directly	 to	 any	 specific	 mine	 or	
grenade	 as	 the	 actual	 conditions	 have	 an	
enormous	 influence	 on	 the	 real	 threat.	
However,	 a	 level	 of	 600	 m/sec	 can	 be	 di-
rectly	 compared	 to	 other	means	 of	 protec-
tion;	 for	 instance,	 standard	 body	 armour	
(without	vest-insert	plates)	represents	a	level	
of	protection	of	450	m/sec	and	contains	only	
about	half	the	amount	of	ballistic	material.	
A	passenger	in	a	vehicle	that	hits	fragment-
ing	ERW	is	much	better	off	if	the	vehicle	is	
equipped	with	 ballistic	 blankets	 than	 if	 he	
is	 wearing	 body	 armour;	 in	 addition	 to	 a	
higher	 ballistic	 level,	 the	 ballistic	 blankets	
will	 offer	protection	of	 the	 extremities	 and	
not	only	the	torso.	
Interestingly,	 compared	 to	 a	 fully	 ar-
moured	 SUV,3	 many	 soft-skinned	 vehicles	
equipped	 with	 ballistic	 blankets	 are	 better	
protected	 against	 landmines	 detonating	 on	
the	ground.	The	reason	for	this	seeming	in-
consistency	is	because	most	armoured	SUVs	
are	designed	with	a	level	of	floor	protection	
according	 to	 an	 old	 German	 standard	 for	
armoured	 limousines	 known	 as	 the	 “two	
hand	 grenades”	 level.	 Unfortunately,	 the	
specified	 grenade—the	 German	 type	
DM51—is	quite	small	and	contains	relative-
ly	small	fragments	that	are	easily	stopped.	
In	addition	to	blankets,	various	systems	
exist	on	the	market	to	shield	the	passengers	
from	fragments.	
New	 technologies	 with	 in-the-field	 ar-
mouring	options	can	be	fitted	and	removed	
when	 there	 is	 no	 immediate	 danger.	 This	
type	of	protection	is	designed	to	provide	an	
increased	 level	of	protection	against	ERW	
and	 other	 weapons	 that	 explode	 next	 to	
the	 vehicles.	 The	 increased	 availability	 of	
these	options	improves	the	safety	potential	
for	vehicles	working	in	proximity	to	ERW.	
In	turn,	these	options	and	those	developed	
and	 implemented	 in	 the	 future	 will	 con-
tinue	 to	 better	 the	 working	 conditions	 of	
personnel	exposed	to	such	risks.
See Endnotes, page 109
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Ballistic	blankets.
W orldwide,	 landmines	 and	 unexploded	ordnance	 kill	 and	 maim	 approximately	20,000	 people	 annually,	 one	 third	 of	
them	children.3	
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 international	 community	 has	
not	paid	serious	attention	to	the	risk	posed	by	the	UXO	
problem	 (i.e.,	 explosive	 ordnance	 that	 is	 used	 during	
armed	conflict	but	fails	to	detonate).	It	is	impossible	to	
accurately	count	the	number	of	uncleared	mines	and	it	
is	also	uncertain	how	much	UXO	remains.	However,	it	
is	believed	the	total	number	of	items	of	UXO,	no	mat-
ter	the	type,	greatly	exceed	the	total	number	of	mines.	
UXO	and	other	explosive	items	such	as	abandoned	ord-
nance	 (all	 grouped	 together	 under	 the	 term	 explosive 
remnants of war)	continue	to	appear	in	huge	numbers	in	
previous	areas	of	conflict.	Some	countries,	like	Laos	and	
Vietnam,	are	more	affected	by	UXO	than	mines.	
Nowadays	 the	 international	 community	 is	 paying	
more	 serious	 attention	 to	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	 the	UXO	
problem.	This	is	reaffirmed	by	the	adoption	of	Protocol	
V	to	the	Convention	on	Certain	Conventional	Weapons.	
The	adoption	of	Protocol	V	on	28	November	2003	was	
possible	thanks	to	governments	acknowledging	the	seri-
ousness	of	the	post-conflict	problems	posed	by	UXO	as	
well	as	the	necessity	to	minimize	the	risk	and	impact	of	
UXO.	 Tajikistan	 ratified	 Protocol	 V	 on	 20	 December	
2005,	and	the	Protocol	entered	into	force	for	all	parties	on	
12	November	2006.	In	accordance	with	the	Protocol,	the	
term	ERW	encompasses	UXO	and	abandoned	explosive	
ordnance	in	conflict	areas.	This	Protocol	obliges	the	con-
flicting	parties,	as	well	as	States	Parties,	to	be	responsible	
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with	regard	to	all	UXO	under	their	control.	Tajikistan	also	has	a	landmine	problem	
and	has	ratified	the	Ottawa	Convention.4	Together,	these	two	documents	stipulate	
that	after	active	military	fighting	ceases,	countries	should	mark	and	clear	the	mines	
as	well	as	liquidate	and	destroy	all	mines	and	UXO	under	their	control.	
Impact of ERW in Tajikistan
In	addition	to	the	landmine	problem,	items	of	UXO	also	pose	a	great	challenge	
in	Tajikistan.	It	is	presumed	that	most	ERW	remains	in	the	country	due	to	the	
civil	war	(1992–1997).	The	UXO	in	Tajikistan	that	remains	on	the	ground	is	the	
result	of	being	fired	 from	military	planes	and	helicopters,	as	well	as	 shelling.	A	
large	number	of	Tajik	citizens	have	consequently	died	or	been	seriously	injured.	
It	is	necessary	to	note	that	items	of	UXO	also	appear	in	the	country	for	reasons	
unrelated	to	war,	including	armed	violence	and	attempted	revolts.	In	Tajikistan,	
as	 in	many	other	 countries,	mandatory	military	 service	 requires	 continued	and	
regular	military	training	for	the	Armed	Forces.	It	has	been	the	case	in	Tajikistan	
that	during	training,	some	shells	have	been	fired	and	accidentally	landed	outside	
the	military	training	zone.	These	shells	remain	unexploded	in	areas	where	access	
to	the	public	remains	open,	putting	the	local	population	at	risk.
Since	the	implementation	of	the	Tajikistan	Mine	Action	Programme,	the	man-
ual	mine-clearance	teams	and	survey	teams	have	found	and	destroyed	more	than	
700	pieces	of	UXO.	A	majority	of	the	ERW	were	found	in	the	central	region	of	
the	country	where	fighting	took	place	during	the	civil	war.	Until	the	ERW	are	re-
moved	from	these	areas,	they	will	continue	to	pose	a	great	risk	to	the	population.
In	Tajikistan,	despite	the	ERW	problem,	civilians	go	about	their	daily	business	
and	continue	 to	find	themselves	 in	dangerous	areas,	at	 times	 receiving	 injuries.	
For	example,	in	February	2006,	two	teenagers—brother	N.	Yorov,	15,	and	sister	
M.	Yorova,	16,	from	Besimas	village	in	Hissor	district—were	injured	by	a	UXO	
explosion	while	cutting	wood.	N.	Yorov’s	leg	was	seriously	injured	and	his	sister	
received	injuries	to	her	stomach.	Due	to	the	lack	of	financial	means,	the	family	
was	unable	to	provide	necessary	medical	care	for	the	teenagers,	which	has	greatly	
hampered	their	recovery.	An	investigation	into	the	cause	of	this	explosion	revealed	
A	group	of	houses	in	close	proximity	to	a	mine	danger	zone.	
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that	the	piece	of	UXO	had	been	just	beyond	
the	 limits	of	 a	 local	military	 training	area.	
No	other	source	of	UXO	contamination	was	
identified	in	this	case.	
A	 similar	 accident	 happened	 to	 Z.	
Urazov,	15,	an	inhabitant	of	Rudaki	district.	
Having	found	a	piece	of	UXO	while	 tend-
ing	animals	in	the	community	grazing	area,	
he	lost	his	right	hand	and	eye	as	a	result	of	
the	explosion.
Additional	examples	of	incidents	involv-
ing	ERW	are	noted	in	the	brief	stories	at	the	
top	of	the	page.	These	are	clear	indications	
of	 continuous	 suffering	 in	 the	 Rasht	 and	
Tavildara	 areas	 where	 ordnance	 was	 fired	
from	aircraft	during	the	civil	war.
Collection and Demolition of ERW
Tajikistan,	 as	 State	 Party	 to	 both	 the	
Ottawa	 Convention	 and	 Protocol	 V	 of	
the	 Convention	 on	 Certain	 Conventional	
Weapons,	 takes	 all	 the	 necessary	measures	
to	find	and	demolish	mines	and	ERW.	
On	2	December	1994,	 the	President	of	
the	Republic	of	Tajikistan	issued	the	Decree 
on Voluntary Surrender and Recapturing of 
Fire Arms and Military Ammunitions from 
the Population.	 This	 decree	 became	 an	 in-
strument	for	disarming	illegal	armed	groups	
and	 recapturing	 firearms	 that	 remained	 in	
the	hands	of	the	civilian	population.	Table	1	
shows	the	number	of	firearms	returned	from	
1994	to	2006.
In March 1993, two brothers—Bahriddin and Nuriddin Eshonov, ages 18 and 17—found a 
piece of ERW and began to open it. This action resulted in an explosion and the brothers 
were both killed. 
In	 accordance	 with	 the	 agreement	 be-
tween	 the	 government	 of	 the	 Republic	
of	 Tajikistan	 and	 the	 Organization	 for	
Security	and	Co-operation	in	Europe	dated	
16	May	2005	and	within	the	framework	of	
the	 Programme	 of	 Small	 Arms	 and	 Light	
Weapons,	an	Explosive	Demolition	Centre	
was	 established	 within	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Defence.	Its	major	objective	is	to	facilitate	
the	demolition	of	ERW.	More	than	70	met-
ric	tons	(77	tons)	of	ERW	have	been	demol-
ished	as	of	19	October	2006,	and	the	work	
is	ongoing.	
Conclusion
Taking	 the	 serious	 consequences	 of	
ERW	 into	 consideration,	 it	 is	 necessary	
to	point	out	that	the	adoption	of	Protocol	
V	by	the	international	community	and	its	
entry	 into	 force	 has	 great	 importance	 for	
the	safety	of	civilians.	Of	course,	it	signifi-
cantly	depends	on	the	process	of	accession	
of	the	governments	and	the	fulfilment	of	its	
Kalashnikov gun ,101
Pistol 2,6
Rifle 3,0
Other types of guns 1,02
Hunting gun/ERW ,06
Total 26,865
On 23 July 1993, 11-year-old Khusrav Rafiyev found an item of UXO and tried 
to burn it. The resulting explosion blinded the boy. 
On 23 April 2005 two brothers—Salim and Mahmadali Saimuddinov, ages 8 and 
9—and 5-year-old Fathiddin Ilhomiddinov from the village of Khost found a piece 
of UXO while they were gathering wood. They began to cut it with an axe which 
resulted in an explosion and all three of the boys were seriously injured.
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provisions	by	State	Parties.	TMAC	hopes	
the	 implementation	 of	 Protocol	V	 allows	
all	parties	to	take	practical	measures	to	de-
molish	 ERW	 efficiently	 and	 productively	
to	provide	safety	for	all.	
See Endnotes, page 109
Two	children	walking	along	a	dusty	road.
Obsolete	 ammunition	 is	 a	major	 problem	 in	many	 countries,	 especially	in	war-torn	 countries	 like	Afghanistan,	 Iraq,	Sudan	 and	Lebanon.	To	restore	peace,	it	is	imperative	to	dispose	of	the	ammunition,	as	this	will	
reduce	 the	 capabilities	 to	 continue	 the	warfare.	 Explosive	 remnants	 of	war	 are	
normally	 destroyed	by	 open	burning	 or	 open	detonation	 (OB/OD)	 in	 suitable	
amounts	 according	 to	 national	 regulations	 or	 according	 to	 International Mine 
Action Standards 11.10 and 11.20.1	These	methods	create	environmental	problems,	
however,	as	huge	quantities	of	metal	fragments,	dust	and	nitrogen	oxides	(NOx)2	
are	emitted	to	the	environment.
Agenda for ERW and Ammunition Stockpile Disposal 
As	a	result	of	the	end	of	crises	and	conflicts	around	the	world,	vast	quantities	
of	ammunition	have	been	destroyed	by	OB/OD.	They	have	come	from	a	variety	
of	sources,	primarily:
•	 Excess	 stocks	 of	 military	 ammunition	 resulting	 from	 the	 ending	 of	
crises/conflicts
•	 Unexploded	ordnance	on	former	military	training	or	gunnery	ranges
•	 Mines	and	UXO	remaining	from	military	and	some	civil	conflicts
The	amount	of	ammunition	in	abandoned	stockpiles	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	
comprises	several	hundred	tonnes	of	various	types	of	munition.	
In	the	wake	of	the	recent	conflicts	in	the	Persian	and	Balkan	areas,	many	
questions	have	been	raised	about	post-war	effects,	such	as	the	environmental	
pollution	caused	by	OB/OD	of	ammunition	 stockpiles.	Kuwait	has	claimed	
compensation	from	the	Iraqi	government	for	severe	damage	of	the	desert	en-
vironment	caused	by	chemical	pollution	of	sand	and	soil	because	of	OB/OD	
Industrial Ammunition Stockpile 
Recovery: Saving Energy and Resources 
and Protecting the Environment
This article presents the opportunities for the disposal of ammunition in an economically and 
environmentally feasible way, focusing on post-conflict disposal of larger stocks of ammunition 
with a special view to the ongoing Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programme in Afghanistan 
managed by the Afghanistan New Beginning Programme. The contents of the article are based 
on the experiences gathered under the umbrella of the research and development programmes 
Western European Armament Group European Cooperation for the Long-Term in Defence and 
European Union L’Instrument Financier pour L’Environnement (EU LIFE), together with a study 
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disposal	 of	 abandoned	 Iraqi	 ammunition	 after	 the	
First	Gulf	War	in	1991.	
Today	 the	 international	 market	 for	 scrap	 metal	
is	 very	 favourable,	 and	 the	 prices	 of	 scrap	 iron	 and	
especially	 copper,	 stainless	 steel	 and	 aluminium	
are	rising.	
Recovery	 and	 recycling	 of	 explosives	 for	 industrial	
use	 has	 not	 proven	 feasible.	 Recycled	 explosives	 from	
ammunition	are	not	competitive	with	industrially	man-
ufactured	 explosives.	 However,	 explosive	 compounds	
might	 be	 incinerated	 for	 energy	 recovery	 or	 reclaimed	
for	fertilizing	or	other	chemical	purposes.	
The	clearance	of	abandoned	ammunition	stocks	in	a	
post-conflict	area,	necessary	logistics	management	and	
implementation	 of	 appropriate	 ammunition-disposal	
procedures	require	a	lot	of	human	resources.	The	work	
related	to	ammunition-stockpile	management	is	highly	
suitable	 for	demobilisation,	demilitarisation	and	rein-
tegration	programmes.
Taking	 all	 environmental,	 economical	 and	 social	
benefits	derived	from	the	recovery	of	ammunition	stock-
piles	 into	 consideration,	 industrial	 ammunition	 stock-
pile	 recovery	 is	 far	 preferable	 to	 the	 currently	 applied,	
normal	practice	of	OB/OD.	However,	further	investiga-
tion	and	proof	of	concept	is	urgently	needed.
Table	1:	Firearms	returned	between	1994	and	2006.
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